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In three experiments we auempted to extend the cognitive-effort account of 
depressive deficits in memory to naturally depressed college students. This ac­
co,mt maintains that depression reduces allentional resources, thereby impairing 
performance on demanding tash, and has received support through experimen­
tal inductions of depressed moods. Nondepressed, naturally depressed, and (in 
Experiment 2) experimentally depressed college students performed unan­
nounced tests of free recall following learning lash with two levels of difficulty 
and (in Experiment 2) two degrees of structure. In Experiments 1 and 2 we 
measured cognitive effort on those tasks via latencies on a secondmy task. 
Latencies and subsequent recall increased with the structure and diJTiculty of 
the learning task for nondepressed and naturally depressed subjects, but these 
effects were reduced or absent for experimentally depressed subjects. When the 
secondwy task was omitted (Experiment 3), naturally depressed students still 
recalled without a deficit. We discuss possible differences associated with the 
two types of depression and implications for the cognitive-effort acco11nt. 
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Sad moods and depression are frequently associated with difficulties 
in remembering. The most common account of these difficulties relates 
them to corresponding deficiencies in the allocation of attentional resources 
(see Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Roy-Byrne, Wein­
gartner, Bierer, Thompson, & Post, 1986). We refer to this general view 
as the cognitive-effort account of depressive deficits in memory. 
The cognitive-effort account maintains that depression reduces or 
uses a portion of the limited capacity of conscious attention that would 
otherwise be allocated to a particular cognitive task. Depressive deficits 
should occur, therefore, in relatively attention-demanding tasks or in tasks 
that benefit from prior effortful procedures (such as free recall). The ac­
count implies that this drain or occupation of attentional resources by 
depression is pervasive and relatively constant. Other tasks are assumed to 
suffer to the extent that they require more attention than remains. 
The cognitive-effort account has received support in experiments in 
which nondepressed students have been experimentally induced to feel 
depressed (see Ellis, Thomas, & Rodriguez, 1984), but only mixed support 
in experiments performed with naturally depressed students. For example, 
Potts, Camp, and Coyne (1989) attempted to replicate the results of Ellis 
et al. (1984, Experiment 1), but failed to find an overall depressive deficit 
in recalling words processed in base or elaborated sentences. The experi­
ments described here were attempts to extend the results from experimen­
tally induced depression in Ellis et al. ( 1984, Experiment 3) to the domain 
of naturally depressed students and thereby to provide support for the cog­
nitive-effort account. We cannot assume the compatibility of naturally oc­
curring depression with a laboratory procedure for inducing sad mood, and 
therefore this extension to samples of depressed subjects is an important 
step in theorizing about depressive memory (see Ingram, 1989). If "ex­
perimental depression" can effectively model natural depression in their 
relation to memory, then the results from experiments that manipulate 
mood might help us to make causal inferences about the relation of depres­
sion and memory (cf. Riskind, 1989). But if the correspondence between 
the types of depression is lacking, then conclusions from experiments 
employing experimental inductions of mood are confined to that domain. 
EXPERIMENT 
In a frequently cited series of experiments on depressive deficits in 
free recall, Ellis et al. (1984) used the Velten (1968) procedure to induce 
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either depressed or neutral moods in college students, then presented them 
with incidental learning tasks. In the learning phase of Experiment 3 subjects 
were exposed to a sentence with a missing noun and asked to choose one 
of two subsequently presented nouns to complete it. Across the 24 learning 
trials the sentences varied according to the difficulty of completion, as as­
sessed by independent ratings. (A less difficult frame for the word "dream" 
was "The girl was awakened by her frightening __ ," compared to the 
more difficult frame, "The man was alarmed by the frightening __ .") Sub­
sequently, experimentally depressed subjects recalled fewer words from the 
difficult sentence frames than did nondepressed subjects. This finding was 
interpreted to mean that depression reduces task-relevant processing, espe­
cially in situations that require greater degrees of cognitive effort. 
Although the materials used by Ellis et al. had been used in experi­
ments demonstrating that greater degrees of cognitive effort were expended 
during processing in more difficult contexts (Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & 
Ellis, 1979), their procedure did not include such measures. And so it is 
not clear if depressed subjects actually failed to expend the effort required 
by the difficult sentences (compared to the easy sentences). In Experiment 
1 we investigated possible differences i n  the allocation of attentional 
resources by including attentional probes during the learning trials. 
In brief, we selected subjects who had scored lower than 5 or higher 
than 9 on two administrations of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; 
Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) 2-4 weeks apart. Our 
depressed subjects were interviewed to ensure that their elevated BDI 
scores reflected depression rather than other forms of psychopathology or 
illness. Most subjects met Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) for major 
or minor depression (Spitzer, Endicott, & Robins, 1978). The learning task 
conformed to the methods of Tyler et al. ( 1979, Experiment 4), but was 
computer-implemented. It consisted of a series of trials on which the 
presentation of a single word was followed by an incomplete sentence; 
during 80% of these trials a brief tone was presented over earphones. The 
subject's primary task was to decide if the word fit sensibly into the sen­
tence, and the secondary task was to press a button in response to the 
tone. The secondary tone-detection task served as a probe for the amount 
of available resources (see Kahneman, 1973). Longer latencies to respond 
to the tone are offered as indications that fewer resources are available 
for tone detection; one assumes that they are either depleted by some 
extra-experimental factor, such as depression, or that they are allocated in 
greater proportion to the primary task. 
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Method 
Materials and Apparatus 
Learning Task. The learning task consisted of 40 trials of sentence 
completion. Each trial required the subject to view a word followed by a 
sentence with one word missing and to decide if the word fit sensibly into 
that sentence frame. Unknown to the subject at the outset, all words fit 
sensibly into the corresponding frames. The 40 words were nouns high in 
frequency, concreteness, and meaningfulness; their accompanying sentence 
frames had been pretested for difficulty of completion (see Hertel, 1989). 
Each word appeared with easy frames for approximately half of the subjects 
in each condition of depression and with difficult frames for the others. 
For example the word artist was sometimes followed by "The young man's 
portrait was painted by the __ ." Other subjects saw arti<>l followed by 
"The young man's physique was admired by the __ ." 
The learning task was implemented on an TRS-80 computer. The 
program began with the presentation of four practice trials that represented 
each level of difficulty and tone delay. All trials began with the presentation 
of a word at the top of the screen for 1 s. Its offset occurred simultaneously 
with the onset of the sentence frame, which was centered on the screen 
and remained exposed for 8 s. On 80% of the trials a weak but detectable 
tone occurred at delays of 1, 2, 3, or 4 s after the onset of the frame. With 
the offset of the sentence a question mark appeared and the trial was ter­
minated by a key press. A blank screen lasting 1 s separated trials. 
The 40 words were grouped into blocks of 10. Each block contained 
four 5-letter words, four 6-letter words, one 7-letter word, and one 8-letter 
word. Across subjects, words were maintained in these blocks as they 
rotated through the 10 conditions obtained by crossing sentence difficulty 
(easy vs. difficult) with tone delay (no tone, or a delay of 1, 2, 3, or 4 s 
after the onset of the sentence). The order of tone delays was constant for 
all subjects. 
Depression Jnvent01y. Selection of subjects was based on their scores 
on the BDl. The BDI consists of 21  items describing cognitive, affective, 
and somatic symptoms of depression. Higher scores indicate depression. 
Subjects and Design of Mood Conditions 
Sixty subjects were recruited from a pool of approximately 200 volun­
teers who filled out the BDI in their lower-division psychology classes at 
Trinity University. Those volunteers who scored lower than 5 and higher 
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than 9 were contacted again and asked to volunteer for an experiment on 
word processing. All volunteers received extra credit in their courses in 
exchange for participation. 
Upon completion of the experimental tasks (2-4 weeks later), subjects 
filled out the BDI a second time. Those whose scores had shifted out of 
the range of the group in which they had started were excluded from data 
analyses. Subjects who remained in the high-scoring group were interviewed 
in order to determine whether they met RDC for depression. Approximate­
ly one-third of these interviews were conducted by a graduate student in 
psychology who was trained and supervised by a Ph.D.-Ievel psychologist. 
The supervising psychologist conducted the remaining interviews and deter­
mined the diagnostic category from notes taken on the subjects' responses. 
Of the 40 subjects who began the experiment with high (depressed) 
scores on the BDI, 17 remained for data analysis. Nineteen did not score 
in the depressed range on the second administration, and four more sub­
jects were determined not to be depressed on the basis of the interview. 
Twelve of the remaining 17 subjects met full RDC for either major or 
minor depression. Five met all but one of the criteria3 clinician was satisfied 
that the subjects' BDI scores reflected depression rather than illness or 
another form of psychopathology. Of the 20 subjects who began the ex­
periment with low scores on the BDI, three shifted out of that range and 
were therefore excluded. 
Procedure 
The experimenter began by reading the instructions for the learning 
task. Subjects were informed that two different tasks would be performed 
simultaneously: a primary sentence-completion task and a secondary task 
of detecting an auditory signal. In the primary task subjects were in­
structed to decide if the word presented at the top of the screen fit sen­
sibly into the incomplete sentence presented below it. They were told to 
wait until the question mark appeared at the end of each trial and then 
repeat the word and the decision (by saying yes or no). They were also 
informed that most trials would require a yes response, but that some 
subjects would experience a few negative instances; therefore, they should 
consider all decisions carefully. For the secondary task they were asked 
3Most of these subjects did not clearly meet the inclusion criterion of having either sought 
help for their depression or suffered marked impairment in work or social functioning. We 
counted this criterion as being met only when the subject either had sought formal counseling 
or had experienced severe and unmistakable problems in functioning, such as being in danger 
of failing school or of being fired from a job due to depressive impairments. 
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a Note. n = 17. Median latencies were averaged across subjects to produce mean latencies. 
Recall was measured as the proportion of words repeated during the learning task that were 
subsequently recalled. 
to respond to the tone by pressing the button on a switch held in the 
nondominant hand. Instructions emphasized pressing as quickly as pos­
sible in response to the tone, but without sacrificing attention to the 
primary task. 
The experimenter answered any questions, fit the subjects with ear­
phones (for tone presentation), and began the program. The four practice 
trials preceding the learning trials provided an opportunity for further 
clarification. 
After the last learning trial, subjects worked multiplication problems 
for 5 min, when the experimenter announced (for the first time) the test 
of free recall. Subjects were asked to write down all the words they could 
remember from the learning phase. When the subjects indicated that they 
were finished they were asked to try harder to recall and to write at least 
20 words, guessing if necessary. 
After the experiment was completed, we obtained subjects' verbal 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores. The scores were available for 12 of 
the 17 subjects in each condition of mood. They were obtained from univer­
sity records in a manner than protected subjects' confidentiality. 
Results and Discussion 
BDI and SAT Scores 
Mean scores on the BDI administered at the end of the session were 
1 .24 for nondepressed subjects and 16.47 for depressed subjects. SAT verbal 
scores did not reliably differ according to mood group; the mean was 558 for 
nondepressed subjects and 539 for depressed subjects. 
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Latencies 
The median latency (in centiseconds, or cs) to respond to the tone 
was submitted to an analysis of variance, with a between-subjects factor 
for mood group (depressed vs. nondepressed) and a within-subjects factor 
for the difficulty of the sentence frame (easy vs. difficult). (For this and 
subsequent analyses the significance level was set at .05.) The mean for 
each condition is shown in the left half of Table I. 
Median latencies were reliably longer when the tone occurred during 
the more difficult sentence frames, F ( 1 ,  32) = 10.66, MSe = 107.050. 
This reliable main effect replicated previous results with these and similar 
materials (Hertel, 1989; Tyler et a!., 1979). Median latencies were longer 
in the depressed group than in the nondepressed group, F ( 1 ,  32) = 4.44, 
MSe = 519.596. Finally, the interaction of mood group and difficulty was 
not reliable (p > .20). 
The association of longer latencies with depression could be inter­
preted in at least three ways. First, depressed subjects might experience 
motor retardation. Second, while processing the materials in the primary 
task, they might be engaged in depressive ruminations which would occupy 
further attention and delay their responses to the tone. Third, they might 
be processing the materials in the primary task in a more effortfully 
elaborative or distinctive fashion, with no time for depressive thoughts. If 
the last account is viable, then we should expect performance on the sub­
sequent test of free recall to profit from the more effortful processing. 
Recall 
The proportion of words recalled out of those that were correctly 
repeated during the learning trials served as the dependent variable. (The 
very low number of errors in repeating the words did not reliably differ 
according to mood.) Proportions were submitted to an analysis of variance, 
with factors for mood group and sentence difficulty. 
As expected, words were more likely to be recalled if they were 
processed in more difficult sentence frames, F ( 1 ,  32) = 10.04, MSe = 
.021. And, consistent with the latency data, depressed subjects recalled 
more words than did nondepressed subjects, F ( 1 ,  32) = 4.46, MSe = .061. 
This unexpected advantage for depressive recall did not interact with sen­
tence difficulty; in contrast to the findings of Ellis et a!. ( 1984), the effect 
of sentence difficulty obtained in both groups. 
The depressive advantage in free recall probably cannot be attributed 
to higher verbal abilities among our depressed subjects, because they 
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tended to score slightly lower than the nondepressed subjects on the SAT. 
We have not, in fact, developed a post hoc explanation for the depressive 
advantage, believing that it requires replication before such speculations 
are worthwhile (see Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Sanft, & Doren, 1985, for a 
similar finding and interpretation). Instead, it is important to note that ef­
fort effects in free recall and response latencies were obtained for non­
depressed and depressed subjects alike- that a deficit in the recall of words 
from the more difficult contexts was clearly not experienced by naturally 
depressed students as it had been by students induced to feel depressed 
in the experiment by Ellis et al. ( 1984). 
EXPERIMENT 2 
The results of Experiment 1 showed that, regardless of depression, 
processing words in the more difficult sentences required more capacity 
and produced better memory. In short, we found no evidence of memory 
impairment for depressed individuals and failed to replicate the results of 
Ellis et al. ( 1984). What might account for the differences in findings? Our 
methods differed from those of Ellis et al. in a number of ways. In Ex­
periment 2, we attempted to bring the major differences into the context 
of one study so that they could be examined systematically. We now 
describe each type of difference and how its investigation was incorporated 
into the design of Experiment 2. 
In the first place, we employed diagnostic criteria and self-reported 
indices to identify subjects with naturally occurring depression, whereas 
Ellis et al. induced depressive moods. When they work, experimental in­
ductions clearly produce a variety of effects on the individual, some of 
which seem to mimic clinical depression. But as several reviewers (e.g., 
Blaney, 1986; Hasher et al., 1985) have noted, the use of induced moods 
to model naturally occurring depression carries with it a number of poten­
tial problems. Our intent was to address these issues by directly comparing 
the levels of recall associated with experimental and natural depression. 
To that end, a major aspect of our design was the concurrent manipulation 
and selection of depressed moods. Three groups of subjects participated: 
nondepressed subjects in a neutral mood, nondepressed subjects induced 
to feel depressed, and naturally depressed subjects. 
In the second place, the experimental procedures of our first experi­
ment and of Ellis et al. ( 1 984) differed in the extent to which attention to 
the words was required by the learning task. Ellis et al. presented sentence 
frames and word pairs successively for 4 s each and allowed subjects to 
choose the correct alternative at any point during presentation of the word 
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pair. In contrast, we presented a word for 1 s only and followed it with 
the sentence frame; after 8 s the frame disappeared, and the subjects were 
required to report the word and the decision about its fit. Thus, our pro­
cedure implicitly required that all subjects rehearse the word for the dura­
tion of the trial, whereas the subjects in Ellis et al.'s experiment could 
engage in further processing after the choice between words was made or 
allow their minds to wander. 
In the design of Experiment 2, we addressed the role of these differen­
ces by manipulating the structure of the learning task. We repeated the 
methods of Experiment 1 in the structured condition and loosened the 
demands in the unstructured condition. Subjects in the unstructured cond­
Ition were not required to maintain the target word in memory for the 8 s 
of the trial; the word remained on the screen and the subjects reported their 
decisions at any time during the display of the word and sentence frame. 
Finally, we modified our use of the tone-detection task. In addition 
to presenting probes on 80% of the learning trials, we included 15 baseline 
trials of tone presentations prior to the learning trials, as well as another 
15 trials afterward. The baseline trials were used to evaluate preexisting 
differences in response latencies (as might be incurred by task-irrelevant 
thinking or by motor retardation on the part of depressed subjects). 
Moreover, when baseline latencies are used as covariates, latencies to 
respond to secondary-task tones during the learning trials should be more 
clearly indicative of task-related efforts. · 
In summary, the design of Experiment 2 allowed us to compare find­
ings obtained through the experimental induction of a depressed mood with 
those obtained through the selection of natural depression. The design also 
included a manipulation of task structure as a way of determining the 
boundary conditions of depressive deficits. Finally, additional measures of 
cognitive effort were taken in further tests of the cognitive-effort account. 
Method 
Materials and Apparatus 
Group Definition and Mood-Induction Procedures. As in Experiment 
1, we used the BDI to select subjects and categorize them as nondepressed 
or depressed. Neutral, depressed, and elated moods were produced with 
the aid of the Velten mood-induction procedure (Velten, 1968), a series 
of statements that are read silently and aloud by the subject in isolation. 
The subject is asked to try to adopt the mood that is represented by the 
statements. In the case of the neutral induction, the 60 statements are 
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(somewhat boring) facts. In the case of the depression induction, the 60 
statements, many of which are written in the first person, become increas­
ingly negative. The elation induction, administered to experimentally 
depressed subjects at the end of the session, contains statements that are 
increasingly positive about the self. 
In previous experiments (Ellis, Thomas, McFarland, & Lane, 1985; 
Hertel & Hardin, 1990), depressed moods have been successfully estab­
lished by 30 statements (from the original 60 employed by Velten). We 
employed the shorter version in this study and eliminated statements that 
included any of our experimental words or referred to difficulties in remem­
bering (to reduce demands for compliance). 
The success of the experimental induction was assessed by asking sub­
jects to complete the Depression Adjective Check List (DACL; Lubin, 
1965), a list of positive- and negative-mood adjectives that are checked for 
self description. A depression score is obtained by summing the endorsed 
negative adjectives and the nonendorsed positive adjectives. Also, at the very 
end of the session we administered a questionnaire on which we asked sub­
jects to speculate about the nature of their mood during the experiment, 
how long it had lasted, and whether they had described their mood accurate­
ly on the DACL or had told us what they thought we wanted to find out. 
Learning Task. ,The materials for the learning task were those used 
in Experiment 1. However, we made several changes in the task itself: (a) 
The task was programmed for an IBM-XT that presented tones without 
the use of headphones. The tones occurred again on 80% of the trials, at 
delays of 1 ,  2, 4, or 6 s following the onset of the sentence frame. (b) The 
program inserted 15 trials of tones presented alone, prior to the 40 learning 
trials, and another 15 baseline trials after the learning trials. (c) I n  the 
structured condition the word disappeared after 1 s (when the sentence 
appeared), but in the unstructured condition the word remained exposed 
for 9 s and offset with the sentence frame. 
Subjects and Design of Mood Conditions 
Selection. A total of 146 Trinity University students completed the 
experiment; 117 volunteered in exchange for extra credit in their lower­
division psychology classes. When we recruited subjects in this way, the 
BDI was administered to large groups of volunteers in classroom settings. 
Those volunteers who scored 5 or below and 9 or above were contacted 
again and asked to volunteer for an experiment on word processing. At 
the start of the individual sessions we administered the BDI a second time 
to subjects whose first scores were 5 or below. If their second scores fell 
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in the same range, we randomly assigned them to receive a neutral- or 
depressed-mood induction (Velten, 1968). We dismissed the subjects who 
were preselected as nondepressed but whose second scores fell beyond the 
cutoff. 
We obtained the second BDI scores of the subjects who initially 
scored 9 or above somewhat differently, because we suspect that naturally 
depressed subjects deflate their scores when they report to experimenters 
in individual sessions. Subjects who initially scored 9 or above filled out 
the second BDI at the end of the experimental session, together with an 
interview form soliciting further information regarding the context of their 
depressed mood. Having been told that these forms were being collected 
for a different study, the naturally depressed subjects delivered them in a 
sealed envelope to the department secretary. The data from these subjects 
were not used if their second BDI scores or responses to the form did not 
meet the specifications. These procedures have been used by Hertel and 
Hardin ( 1990) and conform to Deardorff and Funabiki's ( 1985) specifica­
tions for identifying naturally depressed subjects. 
In the second procedure for recruiting subjects, an additional 29 sub­
jects were paid $5.00 each for participating. They were obtained through 
summer-school classes in disciplines other than psychology and were there­
fore not preselected on the basis of a first BDl. These subjects all filled 
out the BDI at the beginning of the experimental session. Those who scored 
5 or below were randomly assigned to a mood-induction procedure; those 
who scored 9 or above received neutral-mood inductions and were given 
the interview form at the end of the session. These subjects were evenly 
distributed across the experimental groups. 
Allrition. We discarded the data from 18 subjects whom we initially 
thought to be naturally depressed, either because their second score on 
the BDI was lower than 9 or because they indicated on the interview form 
that they had not been depressed for much of the previous 2 weeks. Some 
subjects, for example, revealed that they had not slept well for the past 
few nights due to class assignments; lack of sleep could elevate scores on 
the BDI but not produce other symptoms of  depression. 
We also eliminated the data from three nondepressed subjects who 
received the neutral-mood induction but produced high DACL scores (in 
the 20s), indicating that in spite of their low BDI scores they were ex­
periencing a very negative mood. And finally the data from five experimen­
tally depressed subjects were discarded on the basis of very low DACL 
scores and a subsequent phone interview in which they denied having been 
induced to feel depressed or lethargic. 
The Final Sample. Data from 120 subjects remained to be analyzed; 
34 subjects were male (the number in each condition ranged from 5 to 7). 
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The 40 naturally depressed subjects all scored 9 or above on the in-session 
BDI and reported on the interview form having been depressed for the 
past 2 weeks. The 40 experimentally depressed subjects each reported in 
a telephone interview that the induction procedure produced either depres­
sion or lethargy (or their DACL scores were in the range of others' scores). 
The assignment of subjects to learning tasks and mood inductions was 
random within blocks determined by initial BDI cutoff and gender (with 
the exception that data from ineligible subjects were replaced when in­
eligibility was determined). Within each between-subjects condition, two 
subject were assigned to each of the 10 counterbalancing conditions of the 
learning task. 
Procedure 
Subjects who had scored 5 or below on the first administration of the 
BDI (and all subjects who had not been pretested) filled out the BDI at 
the start of the session, sealed it in an envelope, and gave it to the ex­
perimenter, who left the room ostensibly to prepare the next task but in­
stead scored the BDl. If the score was 5 or below she assigned the subject 
to a treatment condition (neutral or depressed induction and unstructured 
or structured orienting task.) If the BDI score fell between 5 and 9 the 
subject was told that he or she was part of a control group and was dis­
missed. If the score on the first administration was 9 or above the subject 
was assigned to receive a neutral induction (so that these subjects would 
be treated like the nondepressed subjects). The induction procedure lasted 
approximately 1 5  min and was followed by the DACL, to assess the 
subject's mood. 
The instructions and procedure for the learning and recall tasks con­
formed to those used in Experiment 1 ,  with the following exceptions: (a) 
Some instructions were presented on the computer screen. (b) Fifteen 
baseline trials of tone detection occurred before and after the 40 learning 
trials. (c) Subjects were asked to press any key (with a finger on the non­
dominant hand) in response to the tone. (d) The subjects assigned to the 
unstructured condition of the learning task were told to report their 
decision about the fit of the word as soon as they made it, whereas subjects 
in the structured condition were required to wait until the question mark 
appeared to report the decision and repeat the word. Word repetition was 
not required in the unstructured task. 
A second administration of the DACL followed the recall test. Then 
experimentally depressed subjects underwent an induction of elation. All 
subjects completed the final questionnaire as part of their debriefing. At 
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Tuhle II. Mean Scores on Mood Indices (Experiment 2)0 
Mood 
Measure Nondepressed Experimental Naturally depressed 
BD!b 2.2 2.1 15.2 
DACLb 
First 6.6 15.1 11.8 
Second 8.0 9.9 15.0 
Final questionnaire 
Sadness 2.0 3.6 3.2 
l..cthargy 3.5 4.6 4.8 
Distraction 
Unstructured 3.5 4.4 5.2 
Structured 4.1 4.0 4.1 
0Note. Means were computed on scores from 40 subjects, with the following exceptions. DACL 
second administration for nondeprcsscd: 11 = 34. Distraction means: 11 = 20. 
bBDI = Beck Depression Inventory; DACL = Depression Adjective Check List. 
the end of the session, naturally depressed subjects were given the BDI (if 
they had not taken it at the start of the session) and interview forms to 
fill out and turn in to the department secretary. Experimentally depressed 
subjects were carefully quizzed about their moods before dismissal; they 
were also phoned on a subsequent day and asked if the depressed induction 
had worked and if it had lasted beyond the session. (All subjects reported 
that they left the session in a reasonably good mood.) 
Results and Discussion 
Mood Indices and SAT 
BDI and DACL Scores. The naturally depressed students showed 
moderate levels of depression, on the average (mean BDI = 15.2, vs 2.2 
for the nondepressed students). Naturally depressed male students tended 
to report lower levels of depression than did female students (M = 1 1 .2 
vs 16.8, respectively). 
Table II  presents the mean DACL scores. As can be seen in the table, 
the naturally depressed subjects began the learning task in a slightly better 
mood than did the experimentally depressed subjects. Yet by the time of 
recall the difference was reversed, the naturally depressed subjects reported 
more depressed feelings than did the other two groups, who reported 
similar feeling states. An analysis of variance performed on the DACL 
scores revealed a reliable interaction of mood group with the time of ad-
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ministration (before the learning task versus after recall), F (2, 108) = 
31.71, MSe = 12.253. (Note that the second DACL was not administered 
to 6 nondepressed subjects, due to experimenter error.) 
We also found a reliable three-way interaction of gender, mood 
group, and time of administration, F (2, 108) = 3.35, MSe = 11 .994. The 
interaction of depression with time of administration described above was 
exaggerated for male students, but still obtained for female students. 
Final Questionnaire. A section of this form asked subjects to characterize 
their mood during the computer task and presented a list of adjectives, each 
of which was followed by a rating continuum anchored by not at all (1) and 
extremely (7). Ratings for happy (after reversing the direction), sad, and blue 
were averaged to constitute the dimension of sadness. Ratings for tired, lethar­
gic, and sleepy were averaged to constitute a measure of lethargy. And dis­
traction was made up of ratings for distracted and Did your mind wander? 
Means on these three dimensions are presented in Table II. 
Mood-dimension scores were submitted to analyses of variance, with 
factors for mood group and learning task. Scores on the sadness dimension 
differed according to depression, F (2, 112) = 14.39, MSe = 1.822; the two 
depressed groups did not differ reliably and both indicated more sadness 
than did the nondepressed group. Similarly, a reliable main effect of mood 
group on lethargy scores indicated that the two depressed groups reported 
feeling more tired than did the nondepressed group, F (2, 113) = 7.77, 
MSe = 2.286. 
In Table II, mean distraction scores are broken down according to 
learning task (unstructured vs. structured) in order to reveal the nature of 
the reliable interaction of task structure with mood group, F (2, 114) = 
3.27, MSe = 1.971. The two depressed groups reported feeling more dis­
tracted than did nondepressed subjects, but only if they had received the 
unstructured learning task. 
The final questionnaire also inquired about the duration of the mood 
that was characterized on the adjective dimensions. The rating scale ranged 
from stop ed immediately (1)  to still feel this way (7). A main effect of mood 
group revealed that the moods of experimentally depressed subjects (M = 
3.4) changed more than the moods of the nondepressed subjects (M = 4.9) 
and the naturally depressed subjects (M = 4.8), F (2, 114) = 10.66, MSe = 
2.589. 
Finally, we attempted to assess demand characteristics of the DACL 
by asking subjects to rate the extent to which they had felt the same as 
they had indicated on the DACL (jelL the same = 1 ;  felt very different = 
7), rather than complied with what they thought the experimenter wanted. 
No reliable differences between groups were revealed; M = 1.5. 
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SAT Scores. We procured the scores on the verbal component of the 
SAT for 110 of the subjects (18· or 19 in each experimental condition). 
SAT scores did not differ according to experimental condition, nor were 
they reliably related to BDI scores, total recall, or the difference in recall 
between difficult and easy trials. 
Lalencies 
Baseline Trials. The median time in milliseconds (ms) to respond to 
the tone during the baseline trials was submitted to an analysis of variance, 
with between-subjects factors for the structure of the learning task (un­
structured vs. structured) and mood (nondepressed vs. experimental vs. 
natural), and a within-subjects factor for when the trials occurred (before 
vs. after the learning task) . .:rhe only reliable effect indicated that all sub­
jects responded more quickly on the 15 trials at the end of the learning 
task than they did on the 15 trials at the beginning (M = 343 ms vs. 358), 
F (1, 114) = 5.71, MSe = 2377.94. Evidently, these experimentally and 
naturally depressed college students did not experience motor retardation 
or other limitations that would delay responses to the tones. 
Learning Trials. The median time in milliseconds to respond during 
the learning trials was submitted to an analysis of covariance, with factors 
for task structure, mood (between-subjects), and sentence difficulty (within­
subjects). The average of the baseline medians (pre- and postlearning trials) 
served as the covariate for analyses of between-subjects effects. As ex­
pected, baseline latencies were reliably correlated with learning-trial laten­
cies, R = .67, F (1, 113) = 93.38, MSe = 33755.87. Second, longer latencies 
were observed in the structured task, F (1, 113) = 5.31, MSe = 33755.87. 
Third, longer latencies occurred during the difficult sentences, F (1, 114) = 
32.43, MSe = 5301.48. No reliable differences were associated with mood. 
For each condition the mean of the median latencies, adjusted by baseline 
latencies, is presented in Table III. 
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Additional analyses of the latency data included factors for gender 
and for the position of the tone during the trial (1 or 2 s vs. 4 or 6 s after 
the onset of the sentence). These factors did not reliably interact with other 
factors in the design. (The factor for gender also failed to produce reliable 
effects in the analysis of recall data and therefore wa.s excluded in the 
results reported below.) 
Recall 
The number of words correctly recalled was submitted to an analysis 
of variance with between-subjects factors for mood and the structure of 
the learning task, and a within-subjects factor for the difficulty of the sen­
tence frames. A reliable main effect of task structure showed that requiring 
rehearsal of the words improved overall recall, F (1 ,  1 14) = 5.01, MSe = 
3.958. Also, a reliable main effect of difficulty replicated the usual finding 
that words evaluated in the more difficult sentences were better recalled, 
F (1,  1 14) = 59.09, MSe = 2.519. 
These main effects, however, were attenuated by the reliable three­
way interaction of difficulty, structure, and mood group, F (2, 1 14) = 3.35, 
MSe = 2.519. Table IV presents the mean number of words recalled in 
each condition. We evaluated this interaction through a series of planned 
comparisons among the mood groups, in order to reveal the conditions 
under which the findings of Ellis et al. (1984, Experiment 3) and those of 
Experiment 1 in this report were replicated. 
First, we examined comparisons between nondepressed and ex­
perimentally depressed subjects. [In contrast to neutral-mood subjects, Ellis 
et al.'s (1984) experimentally depressed subjects recalled fewer words and 
did not show the effect of sentence difficulty.] Our analyses revealed that 
an induction of depression caused an overall deficit in recall, F (1 ,  114) = 
3.95, MSe = 3.958. Within the unstructured condition (the condition that 
was roughly comparable with Ellis et al.), the effect of sentence difficulty 
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tended to be greater for nondepressed subjects than for experimentally 
depressed subjects, as indicated by a marginally reliable simple interaction, 
F (1, 114) = 3.62, MSe = 2.519, p < .06. Finally, experimentally depressed 
subjects in our structured task tended to recall fewer words overall than 
did the nondepressed subjects, F (1, 114) = 3.87, MSe = 3.958, p < .06. 
No other effects involving the comparison of these two groups came close 
to reaching significance. We conclude that the results of Ellis et al. (1984) 
were essentially replicated with experimentally depressed subjects. 
Second, we examined the difference in recall between nondepressed and 
naturally depressed subjects. An overall deficit was not reliably obtained, but 
the difference between the two groups did reliably interact with sentence dif­
ficulty and task structure, F (1, 114) = 6.71, MSe = 2.519. Within the unstruc­
tured task, no reliable main effect or interaction was associated with natural 
depression. However, within the structured task, naturally depressed subjects 
recalled fewer words from ea.\y sentences but similar numbers of words from 
difficult sentences, as shown by the reliable interaction of sentence difficulty 
with the comparison of nondepressed vs. natural depression, F (1, 114) = 4.77, 
MSe = 2.519. The mechanisms that produced this interaction are unclear to 
us, but the important outcome was the lack of depressive deficit in recalling 
words from difficult sentences. Thus, although the results of Experiment 2 failed 
to replicate the depressive advantage found in Experiment 1, they also failed 
to produce evidence of a reliable deficit associated with natural depression. 
Third, in order to examine the basis for concluding that experimentally 
and naturally depressed subjects might perform differently, comparisons be­
tween those two conditions were made. They revealed a marginally reliable 
interaction of this comparison with sentence difficulty, F (1, 114) = 3.58, MSe 
= 2.519, p < .06. The effect of difficulty was larger for the naturally depressed 
subjects than· for the induced subjects. Furthermore, this effect clearly reached 
significance in the structured task, F (1, 114) = 5.08, MSe = 2.519. 
EXPERIMENT 3 
In the unstructured condition of Experiment 2, naturally depressed 
subjects appeared to show a tendency toward lower recall of words from 
difficult sentences, compared to their nondepressed counterparts. This ten­
dency did not approach statistical significance; nevertheless we were dis­
satisfied with a conclusion that emphasized the failure to find a naturally 
depressed deficit while performance in that condition seemed relatively low. 
We also realized that our method for the unstructured condition yet 
departed from the methods of Ellis et al. (1984) in that ours included a 
secondary task and theirs did not. The secondary task might mobilize the 
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attention that depressed subjects might otherwise allocate in a task-ir­
relevant manner (see Krames & McDonald, 1985; Williams, Watts, Mac­
Leod, & Mathews, 1988). In order to address these concerns, Experiment 
3 was conducted. 
In Experiment 3 nondepressed and naturally depressed subjects par­
ticipated in a learning phase that was identical to the unstructured task in 
Experiment 2, with the exception that the secondary task was eliminated. 
Other departures from the method of Experiment 2 included the elimina­
tion of the mood-induction procedure and a modification of the recall task. 
When subjects indicated they were finished recalling, the experimenter 
drew a line below the last word written and requested additional effort in 
recall until the subjects had written at least 20 words. The change from 
Experiment 2 was the drawing of the line. This change was implemented 
so that we could evaluate the level of recall before and after the request 
to continue was made. Ellis et al. (1984, Experiment 3) had encouraged 
guessing but not required it. Perhaps naturally depressed subjects recall at 
higher levels only when they are required to guess. (See Dunbar & Lish­
man, 1984, for evidence of a conservative bias in depression.) 
Method 
Subjects 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, 25 subjects were selected on the basis of 
their scores from a first administration of the BDI, obtained approximately 
1 0  days before the experimental session. Those who scored 9 or above were 
assigned to the depressed group and those who scored 5 or below to the 
nondepressed group. The data from five subjects were discarded on the 
basis of the second BDI score and interview form, both of which were ob­
tained at the end of the session. Two initially nondepressed subjects had 
moved beyond the cutoff for the BDI and produced DACL scores above 
11. Three initially depressed subjects produced second BDI scores that fell 
below 9 or claimed not to be depressed on the interview form. Of the 
remaining 10 subjects in each condition of mood, two were men. 
Materials and Procedure 
Immediately after informed consent, subjects participated in the learn­
ing task. One subject in each condition of mood was assigned to each of 
the 10 counterbalancing conditions (related to word order and to the as­
signment of words to level of sentence difficulty). The materials and proce-
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dure for the learning task conformed to those for the unstructured task of 
Experiment 2, but the secondary task was eliminated and no tones occurred. 
After the 5-min distraction task (arithmetic problems), the ex­
perimenter requested free recall of the words. When the subjects reported 
that they were finished, she drew a line below the last word and requested 
that they try to recall at least 20 words, by guessing if necessary. She in­
formed them that guessing often pays off in a correct response. 
The recall task was followed by an administration of the DACL and 
a shortened version of the final questionnaire from Experiment 2. Last, sub­
jects were asked to fill out the BDI and the interview form, seal them in 
an envelope, and deliver them to the departmental office. The envelope was 
marked with a subject-identification number, but the forms were anonymous. 
Results and Discussion 
Mood Indices 
The mean BDI score on second administration was 1.0 for non­
depressed subjects and 17.0 for depressed subjects. The corresponding 
mean DACL scores were 5.6 and 10.8, respectively, and significantly dif­
fered, F (1, 18) = 5.22, MSe = 25.889. On the final questionnaire, 
depressed subjects reported feeling more distracted than nondepressed sub­
jects (M = 3.8 and 1.6, respectively), F (1, 17) = 8.60, MSe = 2.385. 
Depressed subjects also felt more lethargic (M = 3.2) than did non­
depressed subjects (M = 2.4), F (1, 17) = 6.44, MSe = .652. (No apparent 
gender differences were obtained for measures of mood or recall.) 
Recall 
The number of words recalled was submitted to an analysis of variance 
with a between-subjects factor for mood and within-subjects factors for sen­
tence difficulty and type of recall (free vs. forced). Table V shows the mean 
for each cell in the design. The analysis revealed an advantage of words 
processed in difficult sentences, F (1, 18) = 5.40, MSe = 3.003, but this effect 
of sentence difficulty depended on the type of recall, F (1, 18) = 8.39, 
MSe = 1 .525. The effect of difficulty was greater under free recall conditions 
(i.e., before guessing was required), perhaps because few numbers of words 
were produced by the forcing procedure. Also, in a few cases free recall levels 
neared the cutoff of 20 words, such that few words had to be forced in order 
for these subjects to reach the final criterion. Obviously, subjects recalled 
more words under conditions of free recall, F (1, 18) = 19.93, MSe = 6.525. 
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Table V. Mean Number of Words Recalled (Experiment 3)0 
Type of recall 
Free Forced Total 
Mood Easy Difficult Easy Difficult Easy Difficult 
Non depressed 3.5 4.7 1.5 1.6 5.0 6.3 
Depressed 2.8 5.0 1.3 1.4 4.1 6.4 
0Note. n = 10. 
No reliable differences according to mood were obtained. Even the 
apparent interaction of mood with difficulty did not approach significance 
(p > .50). These results confirmed that under conditions very similar to 
those employed by Ellis et al. ( 1 984, Experiment 3) no depressive deficit 
obtained. Although the secondary task may have mobilized attention and 
prevented depressive musings in the first two experiments, removing that 
task did not produce a depressive deficit in subsequent recall. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The results from these experiments are among the first to validate 
concerns about the adequacy of experimental inductions as models of 
naturally occurring depression in the realm of memory research (see In­
gram, 1989; Riskind, 1989). Specifically, the data do not support an exten­
sion of the cognitive-effort account to the domain of recall by naturally 
depressed students. In the ensuing discussion we first review the effects of 
task difficulty. We then propose possible explanations for the Jack of cor­
respondence between the effects of experimental depression and the dif­
ferences associated with natural depression. Last, we summarize the 
relations of our findings to the cognitive-effort account of depressive 
deficits in remembering. 
Task Difficulty 
Performance on the secondary tone-detection task in Experiments 1 
and 2 showed that attentional resources of depressed and nondepressed 
subjects alike were allocated in greater proportion to the words evaluated 
in the difficult sentences, compared to the easy sentences. And, as has been 
the case in other experiments that used these materials and tasks (Hertel, 
1 989; Tyler et al., 1979), words from the difficult sentences were better 
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recalled by all mood groups. Compared to the easy sentence frames, the 
difficult sentence frames seemed to have invited more effortful procedures 
which, in turn, produced better recall (see McDaniel, Einstein, & Lollis, 
1988; Mitchell & Hunt, 1 989). 
In Experiment 3 we took an additional step in bringing the conditions 
of the learning task in line with those of Ellis et al. (1984) by removing 
the secondary task, which might have mobilized attention and stimulated 
more task-related effort from naturally depressed subjects. Yet effects of 
task difficulty on recall were obtained for both mood groups, without 
evidence of a depressive deficit. We have not taken the last step, which is 
to alter the learning task so that subjects choose between two words, as 
did Ellis et al., but we cannot imagine why deficits would obtain following 
choice procedures and not verification. 
Effects of Experimental Depression 
One constraint on the general finding of effects of task difficulty on 
recall was provided by experimentally depressed subjects in Experiment 2. 
These subjects did not produce as large an effect as the ones obtained for 
nondepressed and naturally depressed subjects. Why would subjects who 
experience a transitory depressed mood perform differently from naturally 
depressed subjects? 
One possible reason why lower levels of performance might be caused 
by inductions is related to the severity of the depressed mood (see Johnson 
& Magaro, 1 987). It might be argued that the induction technique produces 
a more extreme depressive state than what is experienced by naturally 
depressed students (see Ellis & Ashbrook, 198X). The scores on the DACL 
in Experiment 2 do suggest that depression-induced subjects had more 
negative feelings immediately following the induction than did naturally 
depressed subjects. But because that difference was not statistically reliable 
and because the moods of the naturally depressed subjects were more nega­
tive at the time of recall, the poor performance of experimentally depressed 
subjects probably cannot be attributed to a more severe mood impairment. 
Another explanation for differences between the two types of depres­
sive groups is related to possible differences in prior experience in mood 
management. As argued by Rude and Hertel ( 1987), mood inductions are 
very recent experiences, whereas a depressed mood characterized at least 
2 weeks of experience for our naturally depressed subjects. Naturally 
depressed college students may develop coping strategies to aid their per­
formance in cognitive tasks, whereas experimentally depressed subjects are 
less likely to benefit from prior experience in managing their mood, espe-
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cially if the mood is particularly acute. Experimental techniques perhaps 
induce moods that are more acute (if not more severe) than moods that 
are experienced naturally (Ingram; personal communication, July 13, 
1990). 
Next, following Rude and Hertel (1987), we considered motivational 
factors that might have influenced the performance of experimentally 
depressed subjects. A focus on possible demand characteristics of the in­
duction procedure suggests that experimentally depressed subjects might 
believe that we expect poor performance from them. Why else would we 
ask them to feel depressed and then administer a learning task? This ar­
gument is pertinent even when the induction procedure seems to have es­
tablished an alteration in mood. The point is that when a subject is faced 
with the choice between continuing serious attempts to recall vs. writing 
down enough words to total 20, experimentally depressed subjects can opt 
for the latter without any loss of self-esteem. They can blame their poor 
performance on our induction procedure. Naturally depressed subjects, in 
contrast, have no excuse for poor performance. 
In short, whenever differences in attributions, differences in prior ex­
perience in mood management, or both are likely to affect performance, 
induction procedures may provide poor models of natural depression. In­
gram (1989) has pointed to additional factors that could encourage faulty 
inferences about the modelling of depressive memory through laboratory 
manipulations. They include the possibility that experimental techniques 
produce moods that lack associated features of depression. We suggest that 
the associated features could, in some contexts, ameliorate depressive 
deficits. 
A few final comments about our methods of assigning subjects to 
mood groups are in order. First, we used a relatively low cutoff point on 
the BDI for selecting subjects for the nondepressed control groups. Ken­
dall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen, and Ingram ( 1987) advised that such a 
method does not permit generalization to "normal" populations, given that 
very low scores on the BDI might indicate abnormal cheerfulness or even 
some forms of psychopathology. Because we did not interview non­
depressed subjects we cannot rule out the presence of hypomania, 
psychopathy, or extreme cheerfulness. A related limitation is that we did 
not formally assess the reliability of our RDC decisions concerning the 
depressed subjects. However, we took a relatively conservative approach 
to counting subjects' responses as meeting criteria for depression. This ap­
proach, together with the procedure of repeated BDI assessments, en­
hanced our confidence that our naturally depressed subjects were indeed 
depressed. 
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The Cognitive-Effort Account 
The cognitive-effort account of depressive deficits in recall implies a 
pervasive alloc�tion of cognitive resources to depression. How does this 
interpretation fare in accounting for the present results on naturally occur­
ring depression? In Experiment 1, depressed subjects took longer to 
respond to the tone and recalled higher percentages of words than did 
nondepressed subjects. Although we did not replicate this depressive ad­
vantage in the subsequent experiments, it was an important finding. The 
similar patterns in latencies and recall suggested that depressives' attention 
was allocated to the primary task, rather than being limited by depression. 
In Experiment 2 baseline and secondary-task latencies did not differ 
according to naturally occurring mood. Subsequently, the two groups 
recalled similar numbers of words, with the exception of one anomalous 
finding. The structured learning task produced a (naturally) depressive 
deficit in the recall of words from the ea.\y sentences, but not from the 
difficult sentences. It appears that naturally depressed subjects had suffi­
cient resources available for processing and recalling words from difficult 
contexts. It is therefore hard to understand how they would lack sufficient 
resources to process the words in easy contexts. 
Our research suggests greater flexibility in resource allocation than 
what has been previously believed about depressive cognition. Rather than 
focusing on the availability of resources, accounts of depressive memory 
should emphasize the allocation of resources (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1 988), 
which is influenced by the requirements of cognitive tasks and the extra­
experimental context for performing them. For example, college students 
are accustomed to performing tasks of the sort that we have used. 
Moreover, all of our learning tasks were somewhat structured from the 
perspective of people who are still functional in a college setting. They do 
not invite a significant degree of initiative in resource allocation, the Jack 
of which might lead depressed students to perform poorly in other arenas 
(see Hertel & Hardin, 1990). But tasks such these might indeed be affected 
by reduced initiative in resource allocation if they were performed by clini­
cally depressed patients. 
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